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This paper extends Lucas (1978) to a production economy with two capital
goods. It is an RBC model in which each unit of investment requires a new
idea, an “option”. When options are scarce, new capital is harder to put in
place and the value of old capital rises. Thus the stock market and Tobin’s
Q are negative indexes of intangibles. During a boom, Q rises gradually,a s
options are used up. Because investment represents an exercise of options, it
has an intertemporal substitution tradeoﬀ that is absent in the adjustment-cost
model. Equilibrium may be eﬃcient even without markets for knowledge; the
stock market may suﬃce.
1 Introduction
This paper extends Lucas (1978) to a production economy with two capital goods.
One is a traditional capital stock, the other is unimplemented knowledge that I refer
to as “investment options.” I shall refer to traditional capital as “trees” and to the
unexercised options as “seeds.” The paper is a specialization of Lucas’s model in the
sense that the shocks to the trees’ productivities are common.
An investment option is a proﬁt opportunity that requires an investment to imple-
ment. It is postponable if it is a patented invention, or if it is speciﬁct oaﬁrm so that
others cannot reduce its value by copying it. A ﬁrm has investment options that it
may use up immediately, or store for future use. A patent, for instance, represents an
investment option that only its holder can implement for a certain number of years.
In a sense, even a trademark represents an option to produce a product that no one
else can make. Some investment options are protected only by secrecy.
I set up a competitive GE model in which to plant a tree one needs a seed. Seeds
are produced by trees that are already planted. The number of trees grows over
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1time and, in the absence of the seed constraint on investment, the model would be a
standard one-sector Ak model with shocks to technology.
The model also embeds in GE and endogenizes what Abel and Eberly (2005) call
“growth options.” It also relates closely to the GE model of Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz
(2006) who study the cyclical behavior of entry of producers but in the absence of
a seed constraint or of “option-value considerations,” as they put it, so that Tobin’s
Q is always unity. The model has no shocks to the investment technology, but it
behaves a bit like models that do have such shocks, such as Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Huﬀman (1987), and Fisher (2005). Investment options are also a focus of the
new Keynesian literature (Shleifer 1986), and the strategic delay literature (Chamley
and Gale 1994). The paper also relates to models of inventories such as Deaton
and Laroque (1992) and Khan and Thomas (2007). The paper’s main results are as
follows:
(i) Intangibles reduce Q.–Because seeds (i.e., “intangibles”) are scarce, the value
of planted trees (i.e., ﬁrms) and thus Tobin’s Q, is always above unity. When there
are many seeds, their price falls, and if the decline is sharp enough, so then does
the price of claims to the output of planted trees.1 Contrast that to Hall (2000),
where Q is a positive indicator of the stock of intangibles because his intangibles
are not embodied in capital but, rather, enter the ﬁnal-goods production function
as a separate input. A natural experiment that distinguishes the two models is a
prolonged war during which unimplemented inventions accumulate (some of them
being incidental accomplishments of defense-oriented research). My model says that
after such a war Q should be low, whereas Hall’s model says that it should be high.
It turns out that after both world wars, Q in the U.S. was unusually low. Also,
measures of intangibles based on aggregate patent applications and trademarks co-
move negatively with Tobin’s Q, thus supporting my model.
(ii) Q rising during a boom.–The main diﬀerence between the Seeds model and
the adjustment-cost model is that during a prolonged boom during which seeds are
drawn down and become ever more scarce, Tobin’s Q gradually rises. That was
indeed what happened during the well-known run-ups of the late ‘20s and mid-late
‘90s. For this implication, the ability to store seeds is crucial; the stockpile dwindles
as the boom continues. On the other hand, the dwindling supply of seeds during
a boom also means that investment declines as the boom continues. Conversely, a
rising supply of seeds during a recession means that investment gradually rises and
Q gradually falls.
(iii) More volatile Q.–The Seeds model introduces an intertemporal substitution
in investment that raises its volatility for given average levels of Q.2 By contrast,
convex adjustment costs make investment smoother. The concept of investment in
1This is a GE eﬀect that arises when all ﬁr m sh a v em o r es e e d s .F o ra n yﬁrm that alone receives
an additional seed, Q would rise, just as in Abel and Eberly (2005).
2By the same token, the ability to postpone investment reduces the model’s ability to explain
the volatility in Q. Intertemporal substitutability raises supply elasticities generally; e.g., of labor
2this model is “extensive” investment in new things, and such investment responds
more elastically to variations in Q; witness, e.g., how closely and elastically venture-
backed investment follows the Nasdaq index.3 In equilibrium, however, investment
is bounded by the available seeds, and this can raise Q to higher levels than in the
quadratic-adjustment-cost model.
(iv) Decentralization.–These results obtain in two decentralizations of the plan-
ner’s optimum. The ﬁrst has complete markets. The incomplete-market economy has
an equilibrium that coincides with the complete-market equilibrium, but it may have
other, ineﬃcient equilibria.
The model is similar to ones in which it is not adjustment costs but, rather,
liquidity constraints that prevent ﬁrms from eliminating the gap between Q and unity.
Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2003) look for a liquidity factor in asset prices, and ﬁnd one
that, however, behaves more procyclically, seeming to pose a greater constraint in the
boom, which is consistent with the Seeds model but that they regard as inconsistent
with the ﬁnancial frictions model that they propose.
Section 2 presents the model, section 3 describes a complete-markets decentral-
ization, section 4 an incomplete-markets one. Section 5 reports simulations, and
compares the model to the data. Section 6 discusses the eﬀect that intangibles have
on stock prices and output, looking at both model and data. Section 7 compares
the model to the standard adjustment-cost model. Section 8 tries to tie the model’s
implications to the behavior of the prices of capital goods and to the skill premium,
and to R&D-based measures of intangibles. Section 9 concludes the paper. Several
proofs and extensions are reported in the Appendix.
2M o d e l
The model is that of a growing economy with two types of capital — trees, k,a n d
seeds, S. A seed represents an option, storable indeﬁnitely, to plant exactly one tree.
Production of fruit.–Output of fruit is
Y = zk. (1)
If X is the number of trees newly planted, k evolves as
k
0 = k + X.( 2 )
supply in the Lucas and Rapping (1969) model, or of sales in the Deaton and Laroque (1992) and
Khan and Thomas (2005) models, and lowers the volatility of equilibrium wages and prices.
3The model was originally meant to explain bunching of investment, with IPO waves as the
empirical counterpart of such bunching — IPOs are also co-move with the stock market. In a partial
equilibrium model, Pastor and Veronesi (2005) argue that investment options are stored during
times of high uncertainty, and that once the uncertainty is resolved, ﬁr m sr u s hi nw i t hI P O s .
3Production of seeds.–Let S denote the stock of seeds. New seeds are produced
by existing trees. Each period a tree gives rise to λ new seeds, i.e., a total of
new seeds = λk (3)
Thus seeds grow via a process like learning by doing that takes up no resources.
The planting of trees.–Planting a tree requires a unit of fruit and as e e d .O n l y
one tree per seed can be planted, after which the seed is used up. Let S be the stock
of seeds and let X be the number of trees planted. Then S evolves as
S
0 = λk + S − X ≥ 0.( 4 )
Since X is subtracted from the stock, a seed can be used to plant exactly one tree.
Thus investment is Leontieﬀ in two inputs, seeds and fruit. Their proportions are
equal, an assumption that we shall drop when we get to the empirics, along with the
assumption that neither k nor S depreciate. Seeds are storable whereas fruit is not.
Timing.–Investment, X, is chosen after the trees produce zk units of fruit and
after λk new seeds. From (4), we have
X ≤ λk + S. (5)
Thus investment is Leontieﬀ in two inputs: seeds and fruit. We shall let investment
be reversible.4
T h ei n c o m ei d e n t i t y .–The cost of planting a tree is, as usual, one unit of fruit.
Letting C be the consumption of fruit, the income identity is
zk = C + X.( 6 )
The shocks.–The shocks follow the ﬁrst-order Markov process: Pr(zt+1 ≤ z0 | zt = z)=
F (z0,z),a n dt h a tz0 is stochastically increasing in z.












Reducing the state space.–As we shall show formally in Section 2.1, constant
returns to scale and the absence of ﬁxed factors allows us to reduce the number of
states from three to two: s ≡ S/k, and z. From (4), the law of motion for s is
s
0 =
λ + s − x
1+x
, (7)
4Sargent (1980) analyzes the implications of the constraint X ≥ 0. I do not impose this constraint
here because the simulations and the data never violate it.
4Figure 1: Relation to the convex adjustment-cost model
implying the inequality constraint
x ≤ λ + s, (8)






x if x ≤ λ + s
∞ otherwise (9)
denote the cost of investment, in units of fruit.
Before starting the analysis, let us proceed intuitively and compare the Seeds
model to two standard models:
(i) The one-sector growth model.–It arises when the inequality in (5) never binds.
The latter occurs when λ is large enough, e.g., if λ exceeds the largest possible z.I t
also occurs, de facto, when the initial stock of seeds, S0, is so large that (5) does not
come into play for a very long time.
(ii) The adjustment-cost model (ACM).–The ACM is like the Seeds model but
instead of (1), (4) and (5), we have the CRS production function













and the states are (k,z) alone. Interpreted in this way, adjustment costs consists
of foregone output. In some versions of the ACM, φ =2 .S i n c e t h e A C M h a s n o
intertemporal substitution component, the two models are never equivalent except in
the special case when the Seeds model has no intertemporal substitution, i.e., when
seeds cannot be stored:5
5Depreciation of S is formally introduced when the model is estimated in Section 6 and when
comparing the Seeds model to the ACM in Section 7.
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Figure 2: Marginal adjustment costs
Proposition 1 If seeds cannot be stored and if
λ = λ
∗ and φ →∞ ,
the ACM and the Seeds model become the same.
Proof. If seeds cannot be stored, the Seeds model has just one state, namely
z,a n d( 5 )b e c o m e sX ≤ λk. Therefore in (9), the cost cost of investment becomes
C (x,0) in every period. And as φ →∞ , the marginal cost of investment in the ACM
also converges to C (x,0) when λ
∗ = λ.
The Proposition is illustrated in Figure 1. In its left panel shows the consumption-
investment trade-oﬀ in the standard model and the convex-adjustment-cost model. In
its right panel,the Figure shows the constraint imposed by a particular upper bound
on x,n a m e l yλ+s.S i n c es ≥ 0, investment can never be constrained by any number
smaller than λ, and so that’s the tightest constraint on x that can possibly arise. This
is the line labeled “least upper bound,” and this is the limit reached by both models
under the conditions that Proposition 1 describes The position of the constraint will
depend on what has been happening earlier. In particular, a “seed crunch” and with
it a high value of Q will turn out to be more likely following a prolonged boom caused
by a succession of large realizations of z. Such realizations are likely to draw s to its
minimum level of zero, leading the constraint to be x ≤ λ.
In terms of (9), The marginal adjustment costs, ∂
∂xC (x,s),a r ed r a w ni nF i g u r e
2. As in the ACM, costs of adjustment are still convex in x,b u tx also raises future
investment costs, an eﬀect absent from the ACM.
The set on which (5) binds.–Consumption is most volatile and investment least
volatile when (5) binds. Let ∆ = {(s,z) | x(s,z)=λ + s} be the set of states for
which (5) binds. In this region, X cannot respond to z and therefore C moves one-
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Figure 3: The set ∆ when z is i.i.d.
statement is conditional on s,b u tf o r(s,z) ∈ ∆, s0 =0 ,a n dx0 = x(0,z0).I f(s,z)
remains in ∆ f o rm o r et h a no n ep e r i o d ,t h e ni np e r i o dt w oa n db e y o n d ,
x(0,z)=λ and c = z − λ.
where c = C/k. The further z is from being a random walk (and it seems to depart
substantially from it, see Table 1), the more these rules depart from what the standard
model would predict. Even when z is i.i.d., x is increasing in z because a higher z
today raises wealth and causes a rise in desired future consumption. Because x is
increasing in z, ∆ contains large z values. For (s,z) ∈ ∆, s0 =0so that x0 = x(0,z0).
2.1 The planner’s problem
Now we return to the Seeds model as described in (1) through (6). The state is
(k,S,z), and the decision, X, is constrained by (5). The Bellman eq. is












Lemma 1 A unique solution v to (11) exists, and is is strictly concave in (k,S).
Moreover, X is increasing in S and, if z is i.i.d., in z.
Proof. (i) Existence, uniqueness: Let T denote the operator on the RHS of
(11). The operator is a contraction and maps continuous functions v into continuous
functions (Tv) which, while unbounded, nevertheless meet condition 1d of Alvarez
and Stokey (2000), whence existence follows. (ii) Concavity: We shall show that if ˜ v
is concave then T˜ v is strictly concave. Let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The constraint (5) is convex
7and its boundary is linear in S and k. Therefore if X1 is feasible and optimal for the
state (k1,S 1) and X2 is feasible and optimal for (k2,S 2),t h e nXα ≡ αX1+(1− α)X2
is feasible, though not necessarily optimal for (αk1 +( 1− α)k2,αS 1 +( 1− α)S2).
Therefore if 0 <α<1






˜ v(k + Xα,λk+ S − Xα,z
0)dF
>α T ˜ v(k1,S 1)+( 1− α)T˜ v(k2,S 2)
Therefore the operator transforms weakly into strictly concave functions. Therefore,
the operator being a contraction, its unique ﬁxed point v is strictly concave. (iii)
Properties of X:T h eF O Ci s





v(k + X,λk + S − X,z
0)dF =0 (12)
(Once-diﬀerentiability of v will be proved later) We have dropped k and z from the
arguments of ξ a st h e yp l a yn or o l ei nt h ep r o o f .W en o wa r g u ei n3s t e p s :(A) If a






H [λk + S − X]
¶
= −H
00 (·) > 0








> 0 (the monotonicity
results do not require the second derivatives) earlier, under (ii) we showed that con-
cavity of v in (k,S) implies concavity of v in X holding (k,S) ﬁxed — i.e., that d2v
dX2 < 0









Reducing the state space.–The following result allows us to reduce the state space
to just (s,z):
Lemma 2 For σ 6=1 ,v is of the form
v(k,S,z)=w(s,z)k
1−σ,
where w(s,z)=v(1,s,z),a n dw h e r ew satisﬁes



















Moreover, v and w are of the same sign as 1 − σ.
The proof (not reported) substitutes the desired functional form for v on the RHS of
(11), and veriﬁes that the same functional form emerges on the LHS. The case σ =1
is covered separately below. Similar results are in Alvarez and Stokey (2000).
8Corollary 1 Au n i q u es o l u t i o nw to (13) exists that is increasing and concave in s.
Proof. Existence: Since a unique v exists, w(s,z)=v(k,S,z)k−(1−σ) is the
unique solution for w. Increasing:I n ( 8 ) ,a r i s e i n s relaxes the constraint on x.
Moreover, if one inserts on the RHS of (13) a function w that increases in s,e v i d e n t l y
the property is preserved. Concave:T h ec o n c a v i t yo fv(k,S,z)k−(1−σ) in S for ﬁxed
k implies that w is concave in s.
Corollary 2 The policy x(s,z) is increasing in s and, if z is i.i.d., increasing in z.
Proof. All changes in s ≡ S/k can be interpreted as changes in S for a given k.
By Lemma 2, X is, for all k,i n c r e a s i n gi nS.F o rﬁxed k,ar i s ei nS implies a rise in
sand in x. The claim about z follows at once from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 w is strictly increasing in z.
Proof. The constraint set x ∈ [−1,z] is stochastically increasing in z.S i n c e z0
is stochastically increasing in z,f o ra n yf u n c t i o nw(s,z) increasing in z0, the second
term on the RHS of (13) is increasing in z.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eC ≥ 0,t h eﬁrst term on
the RHS of (13) is strictly increasing in z.









The proof is in Appendix 1; it follows the proof of Proposition 2 of Lucas (1978)
but is complicated by the constraint (8).
Note that the term (1 − σ)w is positive for all σ 6=1because for σ>1, w<0.
















=0 if s0 > 0
≤ 0 if s0 =0 . (15)
Proof. By Lemma 2, v is diﬀerentiable w.r.t. k,a n di fw is diﬀerentiable w.r.t.




(vk − vS)dF ≤ 0, (16)





















vk =( z − λ)C
−σ+(1 + λ)β
Z





=( 1+λ)vS+(1 + z)C
−σ
(17)






vk =( 1− σ)wk
−σ − swsk
−σ and vS = wsk
−σ









But vS = wsk−σ and the above equation then reads































from which (15) follows.
Let
z
∗ (s)=i n f{z | (z,s) ∈ ∆}
be the lower boundary of ∆, i.e., the line drawn in Figure 3. We then can show the
following:
Proposition 2 If z ∼ F (z) is i.i.d., then
z
∗ (s)=
1+( 1+α)(λ + s)
α
, (19)

















¶−σ λ(1 − σ)w0 − (1 + s0)(1+z0)(z0 − x0)
−σ
1+λ + s0 dF
½
=1 if s0 > 0






















z−x if s0 > 0
≥ 1+x
z−x if s0 =0
On the other hand, if x is constrained and held constant at λ + s as z varies, the
RHS is decreasing in z.L a r g e z’s make the inequality strict. We ﬁnd the smallest
z that will allow strict equality at x = λ +( 1+λ)s. Setting it at equality we have
1+λ+s = α(z − λ − s), from which (19) follows. Moreover, for z = z∗ (s) at s0 =0
so that x0 = x(0,z0),a n dw0 = w(0,z0),w h i c hy i e l d s( 2 0 ) .
On ∆,o n l yQ responds to changes in z; x does not, and therefore s0 = λ is
also unchanged. Therefore shocks to output today have no eﬀect on output in any
future period. Since ∆ contains mainly boom states the model thus implies that the
persistence of output shocks is lower in booms. Moreover, in this case where z is
i.i.d., changes in Q will not forecast output. This matches the ﬁnding of Henry et al.
(2005) that the stock market predicts growth better in recessions than in booms.
When z is serially correlated, the boundary of ∆ is no longer linear but ∆ retains






λ(1 − σ)w(0,z0) − (1 + s0)(1+z0)(z0 − x[0,z0])
−σ




While x is less volatile on ∆, to achieve a given growth rate, x must make up for
its low mean on ∆ with a higher mean oﬀ of ∆, which introduces a force towards
bimodality in the distribution of x and a higher volatility of x.6
6This section relates to Yorukoglu (2000) who studied the relation between income and the variety
of goods and who also had two regimes for consumption.
113 Decentralization 1: Markets for trees and seeds
Assume that a market for seeds exists. If seeds are ideas or claims to ideas, this
is not so unrealistic. Serrano (2006) ﬁnds that 18 percent of patents granted to
small inventors are traded at least once in their lives, and that the citations-weighted
percentage is even higher. Large ﬁrms also often sell their patents and enter into
patent-sharing agreements with one another. Takeovers play a part in achieving
transfers of intellectual capital; this is a fairly thick market in which Microsoft and
Pﬁzer, e.g., have been highly active. A ﬁrm can be said to sell seeds when it spins oﬀ
some activity, or when it hires people at wages that include a negative compensating
diﬀerential for the value that its workers will draws from the experience gained; such a
market is modeled, e.g., by Prescott and Boyd (1987), Chari and Hopenhayn (1991),
Franco and Filson (forthcoming), and Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg (2007). An
example of employees walking out with seeds is Xerox in the 70’s — it had inventions
that it was unable or unwilling to implement and that were later marketed by its
former employees.
Prices.–Let p be the price of seeds, and q the price of a planted tree without a
claim on its current-period outputs of fruit and seeds.
Firms.–Firms last one period. A ﬁrm pays its net sales of fruit, zk − X,i n
dividends every period, plus any proﬁts it makes on buying and selling trees and
seeds. A ﬁrm enters a period with the bundle (k,S).I t p r o d u c e s zk units of fruit
and λk seeds and it plants X trees. At the end of the period, it sells its holdings
(k + X,S0) to the public and to next generation of ﬁrms at the price vector (q,p),
pays all its proﬁts out in dividends to its shareholders, and liquidates. Its proﬁts are
π(k,S,z) ≡ zk − X + q(k + X)+pS
0
=( z + q)k + p(S + λk)+( q − [1 + p])X
after substitution from (4) for S0.
No arbitrage.–A negative X would entail selling oﬀ X trees and X seeds that
those trees embody at a price of 1+p.7 Thus we have the no-arbitrage condition8
q =1+p, (21)
which implies that
π(k,S,z)=( z + pλ + q)k + pS. (22)
The ﬁrst three terms represent rents from trees, and the fourth rents from seeds.
Households.–Households own trees and seeds separately. Ownership of a tree
delivers an end-of-period income z + pλ + q, and ownership of a seed delivers p.
7This happens, e.g., when a company sells oﬀ a division, or when it is acquired.
8This condition would hold even if aggregate investment is nonnegative; an individual ﬁrm could
have X<0 without aﬀecting aggregates.
12Ownership lapses after one period. The household’s budget constraint therefore reads
C + p(S
0 − S)+q(k
0 − k)=zk + pλk. (23)
Equilibrium.–When the households’ and ﬁrms’ plans coincide, (2) and (4) hold,
a n dw h e nw eu s e,t h eL H So f( 2 3 )b e c o m e s
C + p(λk − X)+qX = C + X + pλk using (21)
= zk + pλk using (6),
which coincides with the RHS of (23). Since the ﬁrm’s problem does not determine X
(provided that [21] holds), we shall derive the decision rules for X from the household’s
problem.
The household’s Bellman eq.–We shall assume that p = p(s,z) does not de-
pend on k, in which case (21) implies that q(s,z) also does not depend on k.T h e
household’s personal state is (k,S), and it takes the aggregate state (k,S,z) and
the aggregate laws of motion for (k,S) which depend on the decision rules of other
households as given. The household’s Bellman equation is
V (k,S,k,S,z)= m a x
k0,S0≥0
½
U (zk + pλk − p[S
0 − S] − q[k

























0 = ˆ k
0 (k,S,k,S,z), S




ˆ k, ˆ S
´
are functions that the household takes as given but that in equi-
librium will have to coincide with the household’s policy rules — hence a ﬁxed-point
exercise in
³
ˆ k, ˆ S
´
is needed at the end.
Lemma 6 If equilibrium exists, it is the same as the planner’s optimum.
Proof. Since the household consumes all the output, equilibrium is optimal if
and only if, for all (k,S,z),
V (k,S,k,S,z)=v(k,S,z). (25)
Since the planner’s solution maximizes the representative household’s consumption,
V ≤ v for all states. But when (21) holds, then any (C,k0,S0) that the planner
can feasibly choose is also feasible to the household: Let Ch be the household’s
choice Cp the planner’s choice: Plugging the planner’s choices (k0,S0) into the house-
hold’s budget constraint, Ch = zk + pλk − (p[S0 − S]+q[k0 − k]) = zk + pλk −
(p[λk − Xp]+qXp)=zk − Xp = Cp.T h e nV ≥ v and therefore (25) holds.
13The household is not constrained by (4), so that the two ﬁrst-order conditions











V2dF =0 . (27)





This implies (26) is V1 = v1 and if V2 = v2. In that case prices would coincide with
marginal social values of (k,S), because the envelope theorem applied to (24) gives































,a n dV1 and V2 at (k,S,k,S,z).
Calculating q and p.–Optimum and equilibrium are the same, and therefore p




vS =( z − x)




k−σ and vS = 1
kws (s,z)k1−σ.N o ww ec a nﬁnally prove the result
on the relation between seeds and q:
Proposition 3 p(s,z) and, hence, q(s,z) are decreasing in s.
Proof. By Corollary 1, w is concave in s which means that ws is decreasing in
s. By Corollary 2, x is increasing in s so that (z − x)
σ is decreasing in s.T h u st h e
claim holds for p and, by (21) it also holds for q.
Thus the ability to store seeds reduces the model’s ability to explain a level of
Q above unity. Allowing for intertemporal substitution therefore reduces the level of
14Q and it also reduces the model’s ability to explain the volatility in Q, for the same
reason that in models of storage such as Deaton and Laroque (1992), the storage
technology reduces expected ﬂuctuations in the price of the commodity: Models of
competitive storage imply Et (pt+1) ≤ 1+r
1−δpt,w h e r er is the rate of interest and δ the
depreciation rate or carrying cost.
Book value.–We shall measure the “replacement” cost of the ﬁrm by the stock
of its tangible capital, k, even though the true replacement cost is (1 + p)k.T h i si s
because until recently a U.S. ﬁrm could, and would, treat its R&D as an expense,
and deductible from the ﬁrms taxable income.
Measured Tobin’s Q.–The ﬁrm’s investment activity yields it zero proﬁts. The
income generated by the trees in the ground is zk + pλ and we shall think of it as
the ﬁrm’s earnings or its dividend. Then the “ex-dividend” value of its assets (k,S)
is qk + pS, or per tree it is
Q
a (s,z) ≡ q + ps. (31)
This is what we shall use for Q in the simulated model in Figures 4 and 5, and in the
regression (47). We may think of q as the ﬁrm’s marginal Q because that is the cost
of a planted tree. Thus measured Q exceeds marginal Q.
4 Decentralization 2: Market for ﬁrm shares only
This section simply assumes that the market for seeds is closed and that, while each
ﬁrm’s state (k,S,z) is public information, separate markets for k and s do not exist.
It would of course be better to model the friction that causes the market for seeds to
have zero transactions, but this would complicate things. So, let us assume that only
(k,S) bundles trade in the form of shares of ﬁrms. We use the recursive equilibrium
concept of Mehra and Prescott (1980) extended to a growing economy, as done in
Jovanovic (2006).
Suppose that ﬁrms’ shares trade but that seeds and trees do not trade separately.
S e e d st h e nh a v et ob es t o r e db yt h eﬁrms that produced them, and the representative
ﬁrm holds the tree-seed bundle (k,S) under its roof. The household can own a
claim on the dividends paid by such a ﬁrm and no other assets exist. Therefore this
decentralization has just two markets: A market for output, and a market for ﬁrms’
shares. Since the number of date-t goods (consumption, capital, and seeds) is three,
the number of goods exceeds the number of markets, and we cannot be sure that a
recursive competitive equilibrium is optimal.
Assume a continuum of ﬁrms of measure one and an equal number of households.
Equilibrium then requires that each household hold exactly one share. Firms pay
(z − x[s,z])k dividends in state (k,s,z), and households take ﬁrms’ policies x(s,z)
as given.
154.0.1 The household’s decision problem
With n shares, a household’s wealth is the current dividend, (z − x)k plus the ex-
dividend value of his holdings, ˆ Q(s,z)kn. This wealth is spent on consumption and
on future holdings of shares ˆ Q(s,z)kn0.T h u sˆ Qkn0 + C =
³
[z − x]k + ˆ Qk
´
n,o r
after dividing through by k,
ˆ Qn
0 + c =
³




c =( z − x)n + ˆ Q(n − n
0)
where x is given to the household. The household takes the aggregate law of motion
of k0 (s,z) x(s,z) and s0 (s,z) as given. His state is (k,n,s,z), and, with some of the
arguments (s,z) dropped from the notation, his Bellman equation then is





















Deriving the pricing equation.–As in the planner’s problem, V (k,n,s,z)=W (n,s,z)k1−σ,
where






β (1 + x[s,z])
1−σ R
W (n0,s 0 [s,z],z0)dF
)
. (32)
T h ed e r i v a t i v eo fW with respect to n,c a l li tWn, exists for much the same reasons
that ws does. Equilibrium requires that n0 (1,s,z)=1 . At equilibrium, the ﬁrst-order
condition is
(z − x[s,z])






The envelope theorem then implies
Wn (1,s,z)=( z − x[s,z])
−σ
h
z − x(s,z)+ ˆ Q(s,z)
i
.
Updating, substituting into (33), and dividing by (z − x)
−σ gives our version of the
Lucas (1978) pricing formula
























is the MRS in consumption between today and tomorrow.
164.0.2 The ﬁrm’s decision problem
Since markets for s do not exist, the ﬁrm’s only decision is x. Let us use bold letters
to denote aggregate states and decisions x(s,z) and s0 (s,z).L e tP denote the cum-
dividend price of 1/k’th of the representative ﬁrm, i.e., the price of the tuple (1,s).
Equilibrium is eﬃcient if P = vk+svS,w i t hv deﬁned in (11). The functional equation
(in units of the consumption good) for its cum-dividend price per unit of k is
P (s,s,z)=m a x
x
µ









Writing P in this way implies that s is public information s even when it diﬀers
from s. I.e., (36) assumes that (s,s) is a suﬃcient statistic for the how the market
values the ﬁrm. If the market did not know a ﬁrm’s s, it would try to guess s
from the ﬁrm’s choice of x, and incentive constraints would be needed to accompany
the problem in (36). Thus the seeds market does not exist for reasons other than
imperfect information about s.
In equilibrium,
1. All ﬁrms must choose the same x, and so we ask that in state (s,z)=( s,z),
the ﬁrm will behave like other ﬁrms. That is, at the ﬁxed point for P,t h e
RHS of (36) is maximized by x(s,s,z)=x(s,z). This would imply that
s0 =
λ+s−x(s,s,z)
1+x(s,s,z) = s0 (s,z)=
λ+s−x(s,z)
1+x(s,z) .
2. For all (s,z), the maximized value of the ﬁrm must equal the value that the
shareholders hold:
P (s,s,z)=z − x(s,s,z)+( 1+x(s,s,z)) ˆ Q(s,z). (37)
In fact, property 1 implies property 2 as one can deduce by setting x(s,s,z)=
x(s,z) for all (s,z) so that s0 = s0, in which case substitution from (37) into (36)
makes it identical to (34). Thus it suﬃces to show that property 1 holds. Recall that
U (C)=c1−σ
1−σ so that U0 (C0)/U0 (C)=[ ( 1+x)(z0 − x0)/(z − x)]
−σ. Then, evaluated
at x = x, the FOC in (36), calculated by solving
P (s,s,z)=m a x
s0
½
z − ˆ x(s














λ + s − s0
1+s0 , (39)
and does not depend on the ﬁrm’s action.
17Diﬀerentiability of P.–Similar to the proof of Lemma 4 we can establish that
Ps (s,s,z) ≡ ∂
∂sP (s,s,z) exists everywhere. Since
∂ˆ x
∂s0 =











the derivative w.r.t. s0 is 1+x






sdF ≤ 0, with an














=0 if s0 > 0
≤ 0 if s0 =0 , (40)
Eﬃciency.–Here P is the cum-dividend price of one-k’th of the ﬁrm in current
consumption units. Per unit of its k,aﬁrm is a package of (1,s) units of (k,S).
Therefore, eﬃciency would appear to require that P = 1
U0 (vk + svS).I nw h a tf o l l o w s
we let x(s,z) denote the planner’s optimal policy, and s0 (s,z)=
λ+s−x(s,z)
1+x(s,z) .
The next claim states that if the representative ﬁrm used the planner’s policy, its
market value would equal the marginal social value of the bundle (k,S):
Lemma 7
P (s,s,z)=P, (41)
where P is given in (36).
Proof. Updating (41) by a period we have P (s0 [s,z],s 0,z0)=( 1− σ)(z0 − x[s0,z0])
σ w(s0,z0).
Substituting into the RHS of (36), the latter becomes
















0)dF in view of (35)
=( 1 − σ)(z − x[s,z])
σ w(s,z)
= P (s,s,z), as claimed in (41).
The previous lemma is, however, conditional on the assumption that the repre-
sentative ﬁrm uses the planner’s policy, i.e., that
x(s,s,z)=x(s,z). (42)
N e x tw es h a l ls h o wt h a t( 4 2 )d o e sh o l di f( 4 1 )d o e s .
Lemma 8 If P satisﬁes (41), then (42) holds.
18Proof. If (42) holds, the ﬁrm’s FOC, (40), must coincide with the planner’s FOC,
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−σ = P − (1 + s)Ps (43)
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.
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ws =( z − x)
−σ P − (1 + z)
1+λ + s
=( z − x)
−σ (1 − σ)(z − x[s,z])







[1 − σ]w − (1 + z)[z − x]
−σ¢
B u tt h i si st h es a m ea s( 1 4 ) .
Lemmas 7 and 8 then imply the main result of this section:
Proposition 4 The incomplete-market economy has an eﬃcient equilibrium.
For general parameter values, we cannot rule out other equilibria that are not
eﬃcient.
194.0.3 The eﬀects of ﬁnancial-market completion
If the eﬃcient equilibrium were in fact unique, we could conclude that if all ﬁrms
are publicly traded, the emergence of a seeds market should aﬀect neither prices nor
quantities. It is enough that all ﬁrms trade on the stock market. Even in a ﬁnancially
developed society like the U.S., however, only about one half of the privately owned
capital trades on stock markets, and therefore further enlargement of the stock market
would probably raise eﬃciency, as Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) found in a model
in which diﬀerent-sized ﬁrms gradually join the stock market as they grow.
The eﬃciency result should extend to a situation in which ﬁrms do diﬀer because,
e.g., they draw diﬀerent z’s. Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004) develop a related
one-period model in which ﬁrms diﬀer in two dimensions: Project quality which we
can interpret as s, and managerial ability, which we can interpret as z.T h e y ﬁnd
that even when s is private information to the ﬁrm being acquired, the stock market
achieves eﬃciency.
As far as translating these results to the market for information generally, we
must qualify all this by noting that seeds, S , do not share some of the features of
inventions that are sometimes thought important. Namely,
1. Seeds are of purely private value, and not costlessly reproducible — as informa-
tion perhaps is — and cannot raise output in more than one ﬁrm;
2. The producer of a seed has a perfect property right to it even when markets for
seeds do not exist.
If either assumption did not hold, equilibrium would not be eﬃcient. Moreover,
if inventions were embodied in people and if people could extract the rents from the
ﬁrm, then Q would certainly be diﬀerent and equilibrium could be ineﬃcient.
5 Numerical solution and ﬁtting the data
The Appendix provides more details on the data and procedure.
Process for z.–I shall restrict the realizations of z to just ﬁve values. Since z
is estimated as Y/k, its value is sensitive to how capital operated by private ﬁrms
is classiﬁed. It is likely that a lot or the wartime capital was mis-classiﬁed as Gov-
ernment capital when in fact it was used by the private sector (Gordon 1969). Ac-
cordingly the empirics will start in 1953. But we shall then also take out a constant
and linear trend from z, on the presumption that we do not measure the true k.
In this way we get a trendless z, which is what the model assumes. When de-
trended linearly, z follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation coeﬃcient 0.93,
and innovation standard deviation 0.03. The Tauchen-Hussey procedure for dis-
cretizing the AR yields a ﬁrst-order Markov chain with 5 evenly spread-out states,
20(z1,z 2,z 3,z 4,z 5)=( 0 .32,0.34,0.36,0.38,0.40), and the symmetric transition proba-
bility matrix in Table A:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 Stationary dist.
z1 0.71 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.15
z2 0.18 0.55 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.22
z3 0.01 0.22 0.53 0.22 0.01 0.25
z4 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.55 0.18 0.22
z5 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.27 0.71 0.15
(44)
Table A: The Matrix of transition probabilities for z
which induces the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of 0.93 and standard deviation of 0.03
— the same as the data.
Parameters.–At this point we assume that k depreciates at the rate δ and S
depreciate physically9 at the rate γ so that their laws of motion (2) and (4) become
k0 =( 1− δ)k+X and S0 =( 1− γ)(S + λk − X) respectively. The parameter values
used are shown in Table B:
β σ δ ¯ z s0 λ γ
0.95 6.23 0.043 0.36 0.03 0.075 0.11
Table B: Parameter values for the Seeds model
5.1 Simulated decision rules and Q.
For the parameter values and transition probabilities stated in the above tables,
Figure 4 plots the equilibrium Q, the decision rules and the value function. In all the
plots, the variable on the horizontal axis is s, the beginning-of-period seeds-capital
ratio. For the sake of clarity we shall omit the decision rules corresponding to z2 and
z4.W em a ys u m m a r i z et h ep l o t sa sf o l l o w s :
1. Panel (a) of Figure 4 plots Tobin’s Q.10 As s gets large, p(s,z) → 0 for all
9Of course γ tries to capture what in fact is obsolescence, and not physical depreciation. If the
model is to ﬁt at the national level, then we should use a number for obsolescence of U.S. knowledge
because of being superseded by ﬁrms other nations. Presumably it is smaller than the rate at which
the patents of a ﬁrm obsolesce. One typically uses 15 percent for domestic obsolescence, and some
combinantion of this number with the fraction of patenting abroad and the fraction that foreigners
patent in the U.S. would be needed to come up with the right number for γ.S e eE a t o na n dK o r t u m
(1999) for some of the relevant numbers.
10To calculate Q we substitute fom (14) into (30) to obtain
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a) Tobin’s Q, Q(s|z)



















c) Empirical distribution of s











d) Scaled value function, w(s|z)
Figure 4: Decision rules and equilibrium prices
z, and therefore Q(s,z) → 1.T h em a x i m a lQ of 1.87 occurs when s =0and
z = z5.
2. Panel (b) plots investment, which responds more to s when z is high. At z3,z 4,
and z5, investment is constrained at low values of s. E.g., x(s,z5)=λ + s
when s is close to zero, so that the initial slope of the red curve in Panel (b)
is unity. When z ∈ {z1,z 2}, however, x is never constrained and s then has a
much smaller eﬀect on it. Referring again to Figure 3, neither z1 nor z2 lies in
∆ for any value of s.
3. Panel (c) of Fig. 4 plots the long-run distribution of seeds. Seventy percent of
the time seeds are in the s =0bin, but this bin also contains some positive but
small values of s,a n di nf a c t s =0occurs only 55 percent of the time. The
maximal value is 0.056.
4. Finally, the last panel plots w which is negative (because σ>1) and increasing
in both s and z.
We actually use a version that allows positive δ and γ. Finally, (21) gives us q,w h i c hi st h em a r k e t
value of planted trees in the complete-market decentralization, and the value of the ﬁrm in the
incomplete-market decentralization.
22The eﬀect of s is to move x and Q in opposite directions. On the other hand, z
moves x and Q in the same direction, and this eﬀect dominates so that the correlation
between x and Q is positive as the matrix of unconditional correlations for the data
and model in Table C shows:
sxQ









Table C : The Matrix of unconditional correlations in the data and in
the model
The signs the model produces are correct, but the magnitudes are far apart in some
cases, most notably the correlation between s and z. The model generates the strong
positive correlation between z and Q and the negative correlation between s and x.
The largest discrepancy is the relation between s and z.
5.2 Fitting the post-war series
The state variables of the model are k,S, and z, and the decision variable is x.I n
addition, we focused on the price of seeds, p, but the real motivation for it is the
role that p plays in the price of the ﬁrm, Q.T h u s w e s h a l l ﬁt the following post-
war series: (i) The output-capital ratio, z, (ii) The seed-capital ratio, s, (iii) The
investment-capital ratio, x,a n d(iv) Tobin’s q a sg i v e ni n( 3 1 ) .
In all four Panels of Figure 5, the dashed (red) lines represent the model, the solid
(blue) lines represent the data. Most of the parameters were chosen to minimize the
RSS between the simulated and constructed series. The variables were constructed
as follows:
1 . T h ed a s h e dl i n ei nP a n e l( a )o fF i g u r e5p l o t sz = Y/k. The model has 5 values
of z to ﬁtt h i sw i t h .
2. Panel (b) plots the series for s implied by the model as the dashed line, calcu-
lated via
s
0 =( 1− γ)
λ + s − x
1 − δ + x
, (45)
where s0 =0 .03. The solid line is our estimate of the seeds series, using patent
applications as explained in the Appendix. Constructing the estimated series
involved the introduction of a parameter θ =0 .04 for converting units of seeds
into units of k The simulated s peaks at 0.42 i nt h el a t e‘ 80s. The model
overpredicts the empirical estimate of st, i.e., the estimate of the seeds series
that produces the model’s best ﬁt to the post-war data. Instead of using patent
applications, we experimented with new trademarks and with R&D and as
proxies for λk, but the model’s ﬁto ft h es series did not improve.





a) Simulated productivity shock






b) Simulated s’(s,z) series, s
o = 0.03







c) Simulated investment, x(s,z)







d) Simulated Tobin’s Q, Q(s,z)
Figure 5: Time path of the data and model outcomes
3. Panel (c) shows that the model does not solve the excess-volatility puzzle, but
we’ll see that it does better than the ACM on this score. The inﬂuence of z on
Q is more important than that of s.
4. In Panel (d) of Figure 5 we plot the actual and ﬁtted Q. For the measured
Q, for 1951-1999 we use Hall’s series, but since it ends in 1999, for the period
1999-2004 we use Abel’s data scaled so that the two Q series match in 1999.
This is the dashed line in Panel (d) of Figure 5. To get a sustained rise in Q
we must have a prolonged period during which z = z5. The ‘90s appear to have
been such a period. Evidently, the seeds model explains more of the variation in
Q, but it overpredicts the volatility of x by more. Of course, this model cannot
ever generate Q<1.11
As an explanation for the behavior of Q in panel (d), the model has a problem
with reconciling Q with the following properties of the time-series for z:
11Since investment is in fact always positive, the constraint X ≥ 0 ( i fw ew e r et oi m p o s ei t )w o u l d
never be violated. A second way to explain why Q is sometimes below 1 is to introduce more than
one type of capital. But when there are several types of capital, the arrival of a better new capital
will cause the value of old capital to fall. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) and Hobijn and Jovanovic
(2001) argue that this this explains the low Q in the 1974-86 period, and Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2007) study the entire Twentieth Century using similar logic.
24• Y/k falls dramatically in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s, something that the model
interprets as a low-z epoch causing the huge buildup of seeds portrayed in panel
(b) and the resulting collapse of Q to its lowest possible level of unity, and
• The long productivity slowdown of the 70’s and early ‘80s delays the predicted
rise in Q to the ‘90s. In fact, Q starts its rise in the early ‘80s. Even with the
accompanying rise in the estimate of z, it takes time for the model s (the solid
line) to be drawn to zero and for Q to rise to its maximal value of 1.88.
6 Intangibles and Q
The market value of k is 1+p and the market value of s is ps.S i n c ep is decreasing
in s,m a r g i n a lq is decreasing in s. But we have to show that measured Q,w h i c hi s
given in (31), is decreasing in s. The next Proposition derives a suﬃcient condition
f o rt h a tt ob es o .
Proposition 5 Qa is monotone decreasing in s for all s ≥ 0 if
σ ≥ 1+λ. (46)
Proof. The proof will assume that x, and hence Qa, are everywhere diﬀerentiable
in s (if it is not diﬀerentiable the conclusion that Qa declines remains the same). Then
∂Qa
∂s
= p +( 1+s)ps.
On the set ∆, x = λ + s so that ∂x
∂s =1 . Oﬀ the set ∆, ∂x
∂s < 1. Using (14), and
p = 1
1+λ+s ([1 − σ]w[z − x]





































from which (46) follows.
The proposition oﬀers only a suﬃcient condition, but it also can be shown that
for σ suﬃciently small, Qa rises with s. Nevertheless, condition (46) holds at realistic
values of σ and λ that in the simulation are 2 and 0.135 respectively. This is why the
25seeds model implies a fall in Q whereas Hall’s (2000) implies a rise in Q.I nm ym o d e l ,
variation in intangibles is caused by variation in the stock of unimplemented seeds. In
Hall’s model there are variable proportions between intangibles and physical capital
in production and there is no storage of intangibles, hence a rise in intangibles gives
a rise in the productivity of the ﬁrm’s measured capital and (barring the GE eﬀects
that I have emphasized here) it produces a rise in the ﬁrm’s Q.
In the two panels of Table 3 we have already seen that the correlation between
s and Q (the bolded numbers in the two panels) is negative. The ﬁnding is robust
to extending the number of z’s to ﬁve — see Table A3. Let us explain this ﬁnding in
more detail. In the model the stock S denotes unexercised options. Thus a rise in s
represents a rise in the ratio of unimplemented intangible capital to tangible capital.
The stock of all intangible capital is k +S with k being the number of seeds already







is also monotone in s. Therefore, s is also an index of all options, be they implemented
or not.
Evidence.–Whether intangibles raise Q or lower thus ultimately depends on
whether intangibles enter ﬁnal goods production independently of k as Hall assumes,
or whether they are embodied in k a sIh a v ea s s u m e dh e r e .O n es o u r c eo fe v i d e n c e
is the aftermaths of large wars during which industry resources tend to mobilize for
aiding the war eﬀort and during which unexercised options are likely to accumulate.
In other words, prolongued wars lead to a buildup of seeds as a result of wartime
research for military purposes. This means that after the war there should be a stock
of unimplemented ideas and Q should be low. The evidence from the U.S. and the
U.K. shows that Q was exceedingly low after both world wars. Figure 6 reproduces
Figure 5 from Wright (2004). It shows that of the three epochs when Q was at its
lowest, the ﬁrst was following WW1 and the second was following WW2. The same
is true for U.K. q as Figure 7 (a reproduction of Chart 8 of Smithers 2007) shows.
Since the price of capital goods has been declining faster than that of consumption
goods, we may expect that ideas predominate in the production function for k,a n d
not the production function for ﬁnal goods.
Several alternative explanations come to mind that may explain low post-war
Qs. First, one may wonder whether there is some purely accounting reason why the
denominator of Q was somehow artiﬁcially inﬂated after WW2, having to do with
whether capital was mis-classiﬁed so that the denominator of Q was perhaps too high
But exactly the opposite seems to have been the case — Gordon (1969) convincingly
establishes that much Government capital was, for several years after 1945, operated
for proﬁtb yp r i v a t eﬁrms, yet not counted as private capital, and excluded from the
book values of those ﬁrms. Gordon argues further that this accounting practice this
26Figure 6: three series for Tobin’s Q from Figure 5 of Wright (2004).
raised the measured rate of return on Corporate assets. On these grounds, then, we
would have expected post-war Q to have been high, not low.
A second explanation for low Q after WW2 is that the market expected a severe
postwar recession that would take proﬁts and employment after 1945 down to some-
thing like the late 1930s, that this fear was not fully dispelled until the mid 1950s,
and that only then did markets become convinced that the economy was capable of
peacetime prosperity. This argument will not explain why Q was low after WW1,
however, and the hypothesis still awaits a systematic test.
A third possibility is that after the war there was a consumption boom with people
wanting to borrow and thereby bidding up the interest rate and the rate at which
earnings are discounted, and thereby lowering Q. But interest rates after the war
were near all time lows. Figure 29 of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2006) shows that the
ex-post real interest rate on 60- and 90-day commercial paper was negative for most
of the late 1940s.
Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005) and Hall (forthcoming) estimate that the stocks
of intangibles rose during the 90’s. The seeds model is consistent with this fact only
if we assume that what these authors measure is exercised options. Bronwyn Hall’s
production function estimates can be reconciled with the seeds model if we assumed
that the quality of k is not properly measured, and that the measurement error
depends on the number of seeds embodied in the capital. One would need to relax
the Leontieﬀ assumption of one seed to one tree, and introduce variable proportions.
27Figure 7: Tobin’s q in the U.K., 1920-2006
7 Comparison to the adjustment-cost model (ACM)
The ACM is speciﬁed in (10). As we saw in the beginning of Section 2, the diﬀerence
between the Seeds model and the ACM is in the nature of the adjustment cost. Since




j (λ − xt−j), substituting for s in (9) yields an investment cost
of the form ˆ C (xt,x t−1,x t−2,...), which is increasing in all its arguments. For any
j>0,ar i s ei nxt−j tightens the constraint at t.W eu s et h es a m e(β,σ,δ) and the
same process for z as for the Seeds model. We then choose (λ
∗,φ) to ﬁtt h eﬁrst
moments of x and Q. The Appendix supplies more detail. The procedure gives us




Table D: Values of the new parameters of the ACM
In the ACM, z is the only state variable and therefore a one-to-one relation emerges






which, since φ is close to 2 is almost linear and is plotted in Figure (8).
In Figure (8) we indicate on the horizontal axis the value of the Seed-model
parameter λ =0 .075. The Seeds model has just one shock, z, t h es a m ea si nt h e






















Figure 8: Investment and Q in the Seeds and Adjustment-Cost Models
ACM, but it has a second state variable, s, on which x and Q both depend, and
this loosens the relation between x and Q. T h u sA b e la n dE b e r l y ’ s( 2 0 0 6 )a r g u m e n t
carries over to the aggregate setting. Panel (c) of Fig. 4 shows that in the long run the
steep red curve (pertaining to s =0 )a n ds i m i l a rc u r v e sf o rs vales close to zero are
relevant seventy percent of the time. This curve becomes vertical at x = λ =0 .075.
T h en e x tl i n ep e r t a i n st ot h em e d i a nv a l u es =0 .006, and it becomes vertical at
x =0 .075 + 0.006 = 0.081. The most elastic curve becomes vertical at 0.131, not
shown in the ﬁgure.
Next, let us contrast the two models’ implications for the second moments of the
data when both are constrained to ﬁtt h eﬁr s tm o m e n t s . T h i si sd o n ei nT a b l eE .
Column 2 reports the moments of the data. Columns 3-6 report the results of three
100,000-period simulations of two models when the shocks are drawn according to
the transition matrix in (44). Columns 3-5 of Table E report the statistics for three
versions of the Seeds model.
Column 3 presents the Seeds model under the parameter values that, together
with (44), were used to generate Figure 4 and Figure 5. The initial condition is
s0 =0 .04. One should compare the numbers in Column 3 to the information in
Figure 4. For instance, E (s) and σ(s) are the mean and standard deviation of the
distribution of s plotted in Panel (c) of Figure 4. For the ACM we choose φ and λ
∗ to
ﬁt E (x) and E (Q), which the Seeds model also ﬁts. Otherwise, all the parameters
that the two models have in common are the same for the two models.
The Seeds model vs. the ACM. – T h eA C Me x p l a i n st h ev o l a t i l i t yo fx better;
the Seeds model underpredicts σ(x). On the other hand, the Seeds model does
al o tb e t t e rw i t hσ(Q) while still falling short by a factor of almost two. but it
29underpredicts σ(Q) and σ(c) by less. Finally, the Seeds model has an additional
endogenous variable — seeds — and no new exogenous variables, but as we have seen
in Figure 5 it does not explain well any reasonable measure of seeds. Consumption
volatility is the same in the two models, but investment is more volatile in the ACM.
Nevertheless, the Seeds model explains much better the volatility of Q,a sF i g u r e8
suggested.
How much does intertemporal substitution matter?–At the outset of Section 2 we
argued that the substantive diﬀerence between the Seeds model and the ACM is in
that the former has intertemporal substitution in investment. Column 4 shuts oﬀ the
ability to store seeds but otherwise keeps the same parameters as underlie Column
3.12 As expected, the volatility of investment falls and that of consumption rises but,
surprisingly, the volatility of Q does not rise. How general this conclusion is remains
to be investigated.
(No seed storage) (inﬁnite seeds)
Moment Data SDM SDM (γ =1 )S D M ( s0 = ∞)A C M
E(z) 0.37 0.367 0.367 0.368 0.368
E(x) 0.07 0.074 0.074 0.082 0.073
E(s) 0.002 0.007 0.000 — —
E(Q) 1.30 1.303 1.316 1.000 1.301
E(c) 0.30 0.293 0.294 0.285 0.290
σ(z) 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023
σ(x) 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.073
σ(s) 0.009 0.012 0.000 — —
σ(Q) 0.566 0.302 0.299 0.000 0.069
σ(c) 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.014 1.000
Table E: The Seeds model and the ACM
The eﬀe c to fd r o p p i n gt h es e e dc o n s t r a i n t .–Column 5 drops the seeds constraint
by endowing the economy with an inﬁnite supply of seeds at the outset. Here things
work as expected. This becomes the standard growth model without adjustment
costs. Then Q is always unity, and σ(x) rises above the level reached even by the
ACM.
Cash-ﬂow regressions.–It is customary to regress investment on Q a n do nc a s h
ﬂow and when cash ﬂow “drives Q out” of the regression, this is held to be a problem
for Q theory. But, as Abel and Eberly (2005) stress, investment options are not always
exercised, but their value changes over time, and with it the ﬁrm’s measured Q,a n d
therefore the signiﬁcance of cash ﬂow independently of Q does not indicate a failure
of the Q theory. While they have established that convincingly for the cross section,
it remains to be seen whether the same conclusion holds in the time series in the GE
12At this point, the ACM is more ﬂexibly parametrized than the Seeds model because, as we
noted in Proposition 1, the case where seeds cannot be stored is in fact a special case of the ACM
30Figure 9: Tobin’s Q and the relative price of capital 1953-2001
context. Per unit of k, net cash ﬂow is the same as aggregate consumption, z − x.
We shall therefore simulate the results of such a regression by taking a million draws











where Qa was simulated via (31), i.e., from the ﬁrst decentralization. Given the large
sample size, all three coeﬃcients diﬀer signiﬁcantly from zero. The reason why cash
is positive seems to be that z−x increases in z,a n dz is persistent, leading on average
to a higher x0.
8 Other information about (pt)
One could summarize this paper by saying that it “tries to explain (Qt) by generating
(pt).” So far we have not used any information on (pt). In this section we shall
informally consider two sources of information on p: (i) the relative price of capital
and of high skills, and (ii) the relation between a ﬁrm’s Q and proxies for its S.
8.1 The relative price of capital and the skill premium
Do seeds help create cheaper machines?–Suppose that ﬁrms sell planted trees to
competitive fruit companies who then sell fruit to customers. If we consider a planted
tree a ﬁnished capital good, then marginal Q, i.e., 1+p, should then coincide with
the price of capital. This does not ﬁt the facts, however, as Figure 9 shows; the
de-trended relative price of capital is negatively related to Q. This means that seeds
31Figure 10: The skill premium taken from Goldin and Katz (2007)
are probably not embodied in equipment or, if they are, they do not lead to cheaper
equipment.
Do seeds help create better human capital? – P e r h a p si ti sm o r ea p p r o p r i a t et o
think of seeds as generating human capital that is embodied in people. In that case,
a lot of seeds on hand is like having a glut of technical or other advanced skills.
Thinking this way leads to using the skill premium as a measure of the scarcity of
skills. Since Q is also high when skills are scarce, this means that Q and the skill
premium should be positively correlated over time. Goldin and Katz (2007) report the
time series for college premium and the high-school premium. The college premium
is highly correlated with Q since WW2; it rises in the 50s and 60s, falls in the 70’s
and again starts to rise in the 80s about the same time as does Q. The high-school
premium is less strongly but still positively related to Q.
The empirics of the previous section notwithstanding, it seems more appropriate
to view seeds as being embodied in human capital rather than physical capital.
8.2 The cross-section relation between Q and S
The cross section implications contrast with those of the time series: In periods in
which the economy has many unexercised options, Q should be low, but at any date,
ﬁrms with more options should have Qs that are high relative to Qs of ﬁr m st h a td o
not own any unexercised options. We can beneﬁt from this implication and arrive at
an independent estimate of the aggregate time series of p and q.
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Figure 11: Estimate of 1+p(st,z t) from cross-section data — results sup-
plied by Bronwyn Hall, 1974-2003.
identical. One can, however, inject a zero measure of ﬁrms being endowed with
diﬀerent relative seed stocks, si but the same z as all other ﬁrms. This would leave
all other ﬁrms’ valuations and policies unchanged.
A ﬁrm’s beginning-of-period value would now depend on its state (Si,k i),i na d -
dition to the aggregate state (s,z). The aggregate k would not aﬀect the ﬁrm’s price












Since p changes with the aggregate state (st,z t) but not with i,i tc a n ,f o re a c ht,
be estimated from the cross-section regression of Qi on
Si
ki, provided the latter could
be reliably estimated. I report some results related to Hall (forthcoming) in Figure
11. According to the model, the two lines should have coincided, but they do not.
Why don’t they? Probably, it is because ﬁrms’ zsa l s od i ﬀer and that ﬁrm i,s a y ,
has accumulated an above-average stock of seeds, si, precisely because its zi has been











Now the unobservable zi is negatively correlated with Si/ki, and this invalidates the
interpretation we have given to Figure 11 because a rise in Qi would now possibly
signal a lower Si/ki.
339C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has oﬀered a microfoundation for adjustment costs that emphasizes the
role of new ideas in investment and in the business cycle, and that features an in-
tertemporal substitution element missing in existing formulations of adjustment costs.
This is why the model can explain the sustained rise in Q during a boom such as
sometimes occurs in fact. The paper has found that investment options raise the
volatility of Q compared to the standard adjustment-cost model. Moreover, because
they facilitate the formation of new capital, new ideas reduce the value of old capital,
an implication that we found was borne out in fact. Thus what we often call intangi-
ble capital acts to reduce the market value of tangible capital. Finally, we found that
a stock market alone may suﬃce to ensure eﬃciency of the equilibrium.
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10 Appendix 1: Data and estimation
Data sources are described in table 1.13
Table 1: Data sources
Variable Data source
k Capital stock NIPA 6.1. Current-cost net stock of private ﬁxed assets, line 1
Y Output NIPA 1.1.5. Gross domestic product, line 1 - line 20
X Investment NIPA 1.1.5. Gross domestic product, line 6
Q Tobin’s Q 1950-99 from R.Hall, 1999- from A. Abel, spliced to Hall’s series in 1999
N Patents, Trademarks See fn. 10 in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2006)
kr Real capital stock NIPA 6.2. Chain quantity indxs for net stock of prvt fxd assts, line 1
z Productivity Computed as z = Y/k, linearly detrended
x Investment/capital Computed as x = X/k
n Patents/capital Computed as n = N/kr
We estimate two models: The Seeds model and the Adjustment-Cost model. We
start with the Seeds model.
Constructing ˆ St.–This Appendix concerns the construction of the solid line the
second panels of Figure 5. The law of motion for S given (4). S0 = λk + (1 − γ)S−X,
which assumes that seeds are measured in the same units as k.B u t t h e r e i s n o
guarantee that this is so in fact, and so a new parameter θ must be introduced
(either in the model or in the data) to convert units of patents into units of planted
trees. We shall introduce the parameter in the construction of the empirical seeds
series, ˆ St. We assume that we can estimate λk by
ˆ
λk = θ · (New Patents).
and, to prevent ˆ St from becoming negative, we change (4) to
ˆ S
0 =m a x
³
0, (1 − γ) ˆ S − X + θ · (New Patents)
´
. (50)
13For Patents we use the total number “utility” (i.e., invention) patents from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Oﬃce for 1963-2000, and from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, series W-96, pp.
957-959) for 1946-62. The number of registered trademarks is from the U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1975, series W-107, p. 959) for 1946-1969, and from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the
U.S. for later years.
37Dividing through by k from the data (see table 1), and taking an initial condition
equal to that in the data we obtain the estimated seeds series plotted as the solid
blue line in panel 2 of Figure 5:
ˆ s
0 =m a x
µ
0,(1 − γ)
ˆ s − x + θ NEW PATENTS
CAPITAL STOCK
1 − δ + x
¶
.
The model prediction, the dashed line in Figure 5, is generated by (7) with the initial
condition, s0, also a parameter to be estimated — and set to the same value s0 for
both the empirical and the theoretical series.
The estimation procedure is non-linear least squares. Model parameters are chosen
to minimize the L2-norm between the observed series (s,x,Q) and the same series
obtained from the data. The Seed model’s parameters were chosen in two steps:
1. Parametrizing the z process.–In the ﬁrst step the estimated from the data
productivity process z is discretized into a 5-state ﬁrst-order Markov process us-
ing Tauchen-Hussey procedure. Productivity process was estimated to be an AR(1)
process with autoregressive coeﬃcient ρ =0 .93 and standard deviation σz =0 .03.
The mean level of z was chosen to match the average Y/k ratio in the data. Table 2
reports the Markov transition matrix of the approximating 5-state process. This one
is not restricted to be symmetric.
Table 2: Approximating 5-state Markov process for productivity process
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 Stationary dist.
z1 =0 . 3 2 0.71 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.15
z2 =0 . 3 4 0.18 0.55 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.22
z3 =0 . 3 6 0.01 0.22 0.53 0.22 0.01 0.25
z4 =0 . 3 8 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.55 0.18 0.22
z5 =0 . 4 0 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.27 0.71 0.15
Next ˆ zt was chosen to minimize the distance to the observed level of zt,
ˆ zt =a r g m a x
ˆ zt∈{z1,..,z5}
(ˆ zt − zt)
2
except for the period 1996-1999 when the zt was set to z5 (the largest z)s ot h a ta
better ﬁtt oQ could be obtained.
2. Choosing the other parameters. – L e tu sc h o o s ep a r a m e t e r ss ot h a tt h em o d e l















( ˆ Qi − Q1953+i)
2 (51)
38subject to
E[ˆ xi|λ, ¯ z,γ,s0,θ]=0 .0740,E [ ˆ Qi|λ, ¯ z,γ,s0,θ]=1 .3025.
The weights (ws,w x,w Q) are set to values (2,2,0.01).
The seeds model parameters are reported in table 3. Parameter β was set to match
t h ea n n u a lr i s kf r e er a t eo f5 % . P a r a m e t e rδ was set to equal the average of the




kt . Parameters σ,λ,θ,s0 were chosen by the optimization routine (51).
T a b l e3 :P a r a m e t e r sV a l u e sf o rT h eS e e d sM o d e l
β σ δ ¯ z s0 λ γ θ
0.95 6.23 0.043 0.36 0.03 0.075 0.11 0.04









Parameters β,σ,δ are ﬁxed at the values used for the Seeds model. The parameters
(φ,λ
∗) are chosen to minimize
(E(x | φ,λ
∗) − 0.0740)
2 +( E(Q | φ,λ
∗) − 1.3025)
2.
All the above parameters are reported in table 4.
T a b l e4 :P a r a m e t e r sV a l u e sf o rT h eA C MM o d e l
β σ δ φ λ
∗
0.95 6.2 0.04 1.8 0.6
Table 5 reports the data and the model moments.
Note that correlations in table 5 also have the same sign as those in table 6.
A comparison of model moments.–Table 6 reports moments of the data and of
the various models; the moments were obtained using a pseudo-random sequence of
z’s of length 100,000.
11 Appendix 2: Extensions
11.1 Research
Because new seeds are proportional to capital in the model, seeds pile up in recessions,
and this depresses Q for a while after the recovery starts. If research or other resources
39Table 5: Unconditional Correlations in the Model and in the Data
Model Data
sxQ sxQ
z -0.58 0.45 0.94 z -0.04 0.49 0.71
s -0.08 -0.60 s -0.11 -0.19
x 0.14 x 0.33
Table 6: Unconditional Correlations in the Model (using 100000 random draws of z)
sxQ
z -0.5630 0.6125 0.9390
s -0.3461 -0.5197
x 0.3135
are needed, fewer seeds will be created when p is low. To see how it might work, let
us change (3) to
new seeds = λR
εk
1−ε




1−ε + S − X




The planner’s Bellman equation becomes
v(k,S,z)= m a x
R≥0,X ≤λRεk1−ε+S
(














For σ 6=1 ,vis still of the form
v(k,S,z)=w(s,z)k
1−σ,
where w(s,z)=v(1,s,z),a n dw h e r ew satisﬁes
w(s,z)= m a x
(r,x)∈Ω(s)
(



















40Table 7: Model moments
(No seed storage) (inﬁnite seeds)
Moment Data SDM SDM (γ =1 )S D M ( s0 = ∞)A C M
E(z) 0.37 0.367 0.367 0.368 0.368
E(x) 0.07 0.074 0.074 0.082 0.073
E(s) 0.002 0.007 0.000 — —
E(Q) 1.30 1.303 1.316 1.000 1.301
E(c) 0.30 0.293 0.294 0.285 0.290
σ(z) 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023
σ(x) 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.073
σ(s) 0.009 0.012 0.000 — —
σ(Q) 0.566 0.302 0.299 0.000 0.069
σ(c) 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.014 1.000
and
Ω(s)={(r,x) | x ≤ s + λr
ε}.
Since ε<1, r will never be negative. If z was ﬁrm speciﬁc and if seeds could not
be stored, this version of the model would be close to Klette and Kortum (2004) and
Lentz and Mortensen (2005).
The problem with this is that it introduces a Q-elastic supply of seeds, which will
limit somewhat how much Q can rise in booms. In sum, it will produce less variation
in Q, but maybe a more realistic seeds.
11.2 The deterministic Seeds model
Suppose z is a constant. Since k does not depreciate, x then equals the growth rate
of k and of C. Let’s solve for the constant-growth rate that would obtain in the
absence of the constraint (5). We shall call this the “desired” growth rate, xd.T h e n
U0 (Ct+1)/U0 (Ct)=( 1+x)
−σ and the eﬀective discount factor is
ˆ β ≡ β (1 + x)
−σ . (52)
An additional unit of capital produces z units for ever, and so optimal investment




1 − ˆ β
!
z =1 . (53)
Equations (52) and (53) can be solved for xd:
1+x
d =( β [1 + z])
1/σ . (54)
41The model collapses to the standard model if s goes oﬀ to inﬁnity. We seek
parameter restrictions that will prevent this from happening. From (5),
xt ≤ min(z,λ+ st) (55)
This, however, is a short-run constraint, that holds at each t.I fk were to grow faster
than λ, st would eventually become negative. To see this, combine (4) and (3) to get
S0 = S − X + λk and, hence,
st+1 =
λ + st − xt
1+xt
. (56)
It’s easy to show that λ is the maximal feasible long-run growth rate. Let ε be a
constant, and suppose that x = λ + ε.T h e n
Lemma 9 For all s0 ≥ 0,
(i) ε>0= ⇒ st →− ∞
(ii) ε<0= ⇒ st → +∞
Proof. (i) Let ε>0.T h e n st+1 = λ+st−x
1+x = st−ε
1+x <s t − ε






t →− ∞ . (ii) let ε<0.T h e nst+1 >s t+
|ε|
1+x so that st >s 0+
|ε|
1+xt → +∞.
Desired growth exceeds λ if
[β (1 + z)]
1/σ > 1+λ,
which is also when the seeds constraint binds in every period. High values of z or β,
and low values of σ and λ make it more likely that this inequality will hold. Tobin’s







1 − ˜ β
!






Values of Q above unity arise because consumption growth is lower than it would be
under xd; the rate of interest is thus lower, and this raises the present value of income
from capital above its cost.
The case σ =1 .–From (54), the desired investment and growth rate x is
x
d (z)=βz − (1 − β),
and Tobin’s Q is
Q(z)=
½
1 if xd (z) ≤ λ
β
1+λ−βz if xd (z) >λ .
The value of z at which xd (z)=λ is 1
β (1 + λ − β). Figure 12 plots xd (z) and Q(z).

























Figure 12: Comparative steady states for x and q when σ =1 .
11.3 Transitional dynamics in the deterministic case
We shall just set up the basics, but not carry out the analysis. The transitional
dynamics are easier to analyze if time is continuous. If λ is high enough, the model
has no transitional dynamics because then seeds are a free good, an irrelevant by-
product of ﬁnal-goods production. Transitional dynamics arise when desired growth










zk = C + X,
t h el a w so fm o t i o na r e
˙ S = λk − X and ˙ k = k + X,
and the seed constraint reads
S ≥ 0.






σ .F o r





In this case, the seed constraint must eventually bind, from which point on we have
X = λk.
43Optimal growth.–This is a version of Hotelling’s exhaustible-resources problem.




+ μX + p(λk − X)+nS
where m is the shadow value of S and μ is the shadow value of capital. The optimality
conditions are
X : −(zk − X)
−σ − μ − m =0 (58)
k : z (zk − X)
−σ + λm = −˙ μ + ρμ (59)
S : n = − ˙ m + ρm (60)
and the two constraints must hold.
The region [0,T) where S>0.–Let T b et h ed a t ea tw h i c ht h et r a n s i t i o ne n d s .
For t ≥ T, St =0and Xt = λkt.I nt h i sr e g i o n ,n =0so that (60) implies
mt = m0e
ρt for t<T.
Substituting for mt and from (58) into (59) gives us
μz + λm0e
ρt = −˙ μ + ρμ
which is the diﬀerential equation
˙ μ =( ρ − z)μ − λm0e
ρt
N o wa ne q u a t i o no ft h ef o r m
dμ









The region [T,∞).–Here all the multipliers are constant. In particular
μ =1+m.








This is the present value of a unit of capital. In the limit, consumption will grow at
the rate λ so that
U0(Cτ)








where the rate of interest is
ρ + σλ
which is less than z if (57) holds, so that Q∞ > 1. But if (57) does not hold, then
consumption grows at the rate
z−ρ
σ and Q∞ =1 .
4412 Appendix 3: Proofs of diﬀerentiability
This is the proof of Lemma 4. The complete proof is for the case of no depreciation.










λ + s + h − xs+h
1+xs+h
.
Variations.–We use (39) to ﬁgure out the feasible variations.
Variation (i).–If we begin at state s+h, and if we want to end up at s0










(1 + xs)(λ + s + h) − (λ + s − xs)
1+xs + λ + s − xs
=
(1 + xs)h + xs (λ + s)+xs
1+λ + s























w(s + h,z) ≥ U (z − ˆ x[s
0









= U (z − ˆ x[s
0







= U (z − ˆ x[s
0
s,s+ h]) + Ah (w(s,z) − U (z − xs))
and
w(s + h,z) − w(s,z) > U(z − ˆ x[s
0
s,s+ h]) − AhU(cs)+( Ah − 1)w(s,z)
= U(z − ˆ x[s
0
s,s+ h]) − U(cs)+( Ah − 1)(w(s,z) − U(cs)).




















































Variation 2:S t a r tf r o ms and end at s0
s+h...
Variation (ii).– If we begin at state s, and if we want to end up at s0
















(1 + xs+h)(λ + s) − (λ + s + h − xs+h)
1+xs+h + λ + s + h − xs+h
=
xs+h(λ + s) − (h − xs+h)
1+λ + s + h
=
(1 + λ + s)xs+h − h
1+λ + s + h
=
(1 + λ + s + h)xs+h − h(1 + xs+h)
1+λ + s + h
= xs+h −
h(1 + xs+h)




1+λ + s + h
(63)











1+λ + s + h
¶1−σ
Therefore




















= U (z − ˆ x) − BhU (z − xs+h)+Bhw(s + h,z).
and therefore
w(s,z) − w(s + h,z) ≥ U (z − ˆ x) − BhU (z − xs+h)+( Bh − 1)w(s + h,z),
46i.e.,
w(s + h,z) − w(s,z) ≤ BhU (z − xs+h) − U (z − ˆ x)+( 1− Bh)w(s + h,z) (64)
= U (z − xs+h) − U (z − ˆ x)+( 1− Bh)[w(s + h,z) − U (cs+h)] (65)
Now, [w(s + h,z) − U (z − xs+h)] is Lipschitz in h for every z>0. This is because it
is bounded above by the increment in value when a unit of consumption is added in
perpetuity, and the latter is bounded as long as c>0, i.e., as long as z>0). Now,
by (63), xs+h ≥ ˆ x +
h(1+xs)
1+λ+s+h and therefore
U (z − xs+h) − U (z − ˆ x) ≤ U
µ
z − ˆ x +
h(1 + xs)
1+λ + s + h
¶
− U (z − ˆ x)
Using the RHS of this expression to replace the ﬁrst two terms on the RHS of 65)





(1 − Bh)[w(s + h,z) − U (cs+h)] =
1 − σ
1+λ + s
[w(s,z) − U (cs)]





0 (cs)(1+xs)+( 1− σ)[w(s,z) − U (cs)]) (66)




([1 − σ]w − (1 + z)U
0 (c)) > 0.
For them to be the same we would need that
−(1 + x)U




0 − (1 − σ)U = −(1 + z)U
0,
i.e.
(1 − σ)U =( z − x)U
0
which is true because z − x = c, so that both sides of the equation equal c1−σ.
Therefore (61) and (66) imply (14).
12.1 Notes on diﬀerentiability when δ and γ are positive
Let δ = depreciation of k and let γ be the depreciation of S. The laws of motion and
the value are
k
0 = k(1 − δ)+X,( 6 8 )
47S
0 =( 1− γ)(S + λk − X),( 6 9 )
and




















(1 − γ)(s + λ − x)





(1 − γ)(λ + s) − (1 − δ)s0
1 − γ + s0 . (72)












(1 − γ)(s + λ − x)









w =m a x
s0
(
(z − ˆ x)
1−σ
1 − σ







where ˆ x is deﬁned in (72). Take the derivative w.r.t. s:
ws =
1 − γ
1 − γ + s0
½
−(z − ˆ x)

































1 − δ +ˆ x









When γ = δ =0 ,d o e st h i sb e c o m ews = 1
1+λ+s ([1 − σ]w − (1 + z)U0 (c))? For that
to be true we would need
−(1 + ˆ x)U
0 +( 1− σ)(w − U)=( 1− σ)w − (1 + z)U
But this is the same as (67), and so it holds.
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